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The paper reviews the uses of laboratory experimental economics methods in
the background research and implementation of the Personal Communication
Systems auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission. The ap-
plications began during the rule making process with the testing of broad rules
that might be implemented. Data from experiments were systematically used.
The methods were used again in the software development process where sev-
eral important contributions were made. Finally, experiences gained from the
study of experimental auction processes were used in the actual management
of the first auctions and in interpreting auction performance.
1. Introduction
The use of laboratory experimental methods in economics has been
growing rapidly. With each application, new insights are gained into
how the methodology can be used to supplement the more traditional
forms of research. Such was the case with the development of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) policy for the auction of licen-
ses for personal communication systems (PCS). At several different
stages the laboratory experimental methods of economics were used.
The application differed at each of these stages, representing the differ-
ent types of relationships that can exist among theory, observation, and
policy. This paper is a brief account of the applications.
The use of laboratory experimental data began only after many
major decisions had been made by the FCC. The big questions whether
or not there should be an auction, what was to be auctioned, and when
the auctions were to take place had all been answered. The government
had decided that an auction mechanism should be used in place of the
classical, administered methods of granting broadcast licenses. The
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structure of the licenses had been determined, and the time frame and
sequences of auctions had been determined.
Wisely, the government separated the decision about the rules
that were going to govern the auction from the other decisions. An
independent rulemaking process was used to decide what the rules of
the auction should be. The FCC's rulemaking process took place in fall
of 1993. Decisions were made in the winter and spring of 1994. The
first auction of nine (nationwide narrowband) PCS licenses took place
in July 1994, and it was followed by the auction of thirty regional nar-
rowband PCS licenses in the fall of 1994. In addition the FCC conducted
an auction of licenses for interactive video data services (IVDS) in July
1994.
By the fall of 1993 the business world was fully aware of the
rulemaking process and had engaged many groups of consultants to
help them position themselves. Businesses understood that the rules
and form of the auction could influence who acquired what and how
much was paid. The rules of the auction could be used to provide
advantages to themselves or to their competitors. Thus, a mixture of
self-interest and fear motivated many different and competing architec-
tures for the auctions as different businesses promoted different rules.
The position of the FCC was that the efficient allocation of the licenses
was to be the primary criterion for deciding among the competing
options. The criterion was not to maximize revenue, and it was not to
simply mimic historically accepted methods of conducting auctions.
This attitude of the FCC colored the whole rulemaking process, shaped
the debates, and generally influenced the character of the rules that
were proposed. The efficiency criterion and the openness to new types
of auctions also opened the door for experimental methods. As will
be outlined in the pages that follow, the experimental methodology
provides a noncontroversial, inexpensive, and fast method for getting
data on how various types of auctions might perform. While experi-
ments could not remove all controversy, they could at least remove
part of it.
The first experiments were conducted in the fall of 1993. In Janu-
ary 1994 a conference was held at Caltech in which much experimental
data were reviewed. A group of Caltech experimentalists were hired
in the spring of 1994 to help test rules and to help with the actual
implementation of the auctions. That relationship lasted through the
fall of 1994 and the regional narrowband auctions of thirty licenses.
After that the FCC had its own software, procedures, auction team,
and experience. The report that follows describes what was done and
what was learned during that year of auction decisions and develop-
ment.
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2. Laboratory Methods
Perhaps, before discussing the FCC auctions, it would be instructive
to provide a word or two on the nature of experimental economics as
applied to the study of auctions. The basic idea is to use substantial
financial incentives to create simple and well-controlled auction pro-
cesses. The methods are used to study a wide variety of decision pro-
cesses, so it is possible to compare behavior of many different people
in many different contexts. The people engaging in the auctions make
money that is theirs to keep. The characteristics of the people, the nature
of the incentives, the rules of the auctions, what people are told, etc., are
all carefully considered and may differ among experiments, depending
upon the purpose and what one wants to know. The experimental
procedures, like the ones employed in the experiments reported here,
are exactly the same as ones that have been subjected to thousands of
studies. The results of the experiments are compared internally against
theory and other types of experiments, so confidence is built that the
results are not due to some sort of special or isolated feature.
The general idea of a laboratory experiment is to study the opera-
tion of rules, such as auction rules, in very simple cases. The simplicity
assures that the nature of any problems detected can be identified and
studied. The variables studied reflect human behavior in the use of the
rules, the relationship of behavior to the technology used to implement
the rules of the auction, and the reliability of the technology itself. An
experimental testbed is a simple working prototype of a process that is
going to be employed in a complex environment. The creation of the
prototype and the study of its operation provides a joining of theory,
observation, and the practical aspects of implementation.
Two questions are posed. The first is: does the auction work, in
the sense that it produces outcomes and efficiencies that are generally
acceptable? The second question is does the auction operate according to
the theory that led to its creation? If a mechanism does not work acceptably
in a simple case created in a laboratory, then there may be no reason
to think that it will work in the complex cases found in a field applica-
tion. Such failures are viewed as a failure of proof of concept. However,
even if a mechanism passes a proof of concept, it might have done so
for accidental reasons. Unless the performance is reasonably consistent
with theory, unless the mechanism works for understandable reasons,
then again, there may be no reason to think that it would work in
complex field applications. The second question reflects a requirement
that a mechanism meet a test of design consistency.
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3. An Overview and the Context of Applications
The most intense use of experimental methods in the FCC applications
occurred at three different stages of the policymaking process. At each
of these stages natural research partnerships could be identified. Ini-
tially, the experimental research was focused on broad aspects of the
rules that might be put in place. This was the first stage of testbedding,
as the properties of substantially different types of rules were exam-
ined. The second stage of testbedding evolved as the rules began to
take a more definite form. The study shifted to detailed features of
particular rules and was then expanded to include assessments of the
operational form of specific rules as they were implemented in the
software. Rules, stated as policy, can be very different when they are
put in operational form as procedures and software. Simple laboratory
environments provide an inexpensive method of discovering practical
problems with the rules, as they are found in the real software setting,
that could prove to be very expensive if they surfaced during the opera-
tion of a multibillion-dollar auction. Thus, at this stage, the experimen-
tal methods were, in a sense, part of debugging. The final stage of
application occurred during the actual operation of the auction. Theory,
modified by experience in use, is very useful when attempting to make
decisions in rapidly changing circumstances. The observations from
experiments were used as a source of judgment about events that were
taking place during the auctions and the possible implications of chang-
ing features of the auction (``improvements'') as the auction was taking
place. The paper addresses decisions that were made during the auc-
tions and how they were influenced by experiments.
The final rules used by the FCC had several key elements. First,
the rules were implemented electronically with decentralized bidders.
Second, a separate market was opened for each license. The FCC had
reason to think that complementarities existed among licenses. In some
cases the value of a license depended upon the other licenses held, so
bidders wanted to commit to buy simultaneously. All markets were
open simultaneously. Third, the markets proceeded in ``rounds'' of
bidding. Within a round, bids were submitted for all licenses. Fourth,
activity rules were in place. These rules were used to force bidders to
bid rather than waiting to see how others bid before submitting their
own bids. The activity rules imposed requirements on the number of
items on which a bidder could bid. If the bidder failed to bid (unless
the bidder was the high bidder), then the right to bid in future rounds
could be reduced. The auctions had different stages in which different
activity rules were imposed, and these rules became more stringent in
later stages when the FCC might be attempting to get the markets to
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close. Finally, the auction had a withdrawal option. Suppose a bidder
valued packages or groups of licenses and that the value fell sharply
if any member of the package was missing. A bidder who held part of
a package and felt that the other parts would be too expensive could
withdraw from the licenses held, letting the price fall to the lowest past
bid. If the final price was less than the bid of the withdrawing bid-
der, then the bidder paid the difference. In addition, the auction had
waiver features that allowed bidders to skip rounds a limited number
of times without the penalty imposed by activity rules and thereby
allow time to assess complicated bidding strategies or seek additional
financing.
4. Research On Rules: The First Stage
The first stage focused on the rules of the auction and the consequent
behavior that might be expected under various conditions. Different
rules can induce different patterns of outcomes in terms of efficiency
and distribution, depending upon the underlying economic conditions.
Much of the theory that existed at the time of the design of the auction
was incomplete and untested. No single theory existed about which
there was a consensus. The first stage of experimental work was thus
closely connected to the development of theory and a sensitivity to the
differences of opinions that existed among theorists.
Research during this first stage was difficult. The rules were not
determined. Up to and even during the actual auction, the rules were
constantly and rapidly evolving. By practical necessity, and because of
the need for information, the experiments typically addressed a feature
of the rules, or features of classes of rules, as opposed to fully testing
some well-defined set of rules and procedures. Furthermore, because
of time constraints, decisions had to be made on very small numbers
of observations. The environment in which the actual auctions would
take place was similarly uncertain. It was assumed that the items auc-
tioned involved complementarities, and that a large number of partici-
pants would be bidding. But, the full implications of these assumptions
were never fully explored. Similarly, many relevant environments were
not studied at all. For example, while it is well established experimen-
tally that uncertain common values of the items auctioned can result
in a winner's curse, the special problems that might surface for FCC
rules in common-value environments were not pursued. Time and re-
source constraints prevented the study of many interesting and impor-
tant problems.
Testimony during the FCC decisionmaking process provided a
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focus for early experiments. Three major issues that surfaced in the
testimony were chosen for experimental examination. The first issue
was whether the auction would be one of the forms commonly imple-
mented by professional auction houses, such as oral auctions, or would
be something completely new. In part, this first issue seemed to turn
on whether it was technologically feasible to do something new and
completely different from the time-tested methods of auctioning things.
The second issue was focused more narrowly on the definitions and
characteristics of particular classes of rules: whether the licenses should
be sold sequentially or simultaneously. The third issue was similarly
focused on the details of the rules, and the type of behavior that might
be observed under different rules. As will be discussed, this third issue
was closely associated with the economic environments that might exist
for the FCC auctions. The expected behavior can depend dramatically
upon the environmental features present. The research focused on rules
that might be able to operate in troublesome environments.
4.1 Something Old or Something New
The most commonly used auction rules, as implemented by profes-
sional auction houses, are sealed bids and oral, ascending-bid auctions
in which items are sold sequentially. Experimental research suggested
that sealed-bid auctions would not function as desired. Almost all ex-
perimental work suggests that some sort of iteration is necessary for
processes to have the efficiency and price-discovery properties sug-
gested by pure theory. Equilibration (and thus disequilibrium) seems
to be a fact of life. While no experimental work was conducted to ex-
plore this particular issue, many experimental sealed-bid auctions have
been conducted, and that literature was used for reference.
One early issue was whether the classical oral auction should be
used, as opposed to a more technologically oriented process. Some
voices in the FCC were skeptical of the advisability of using new tech-
nologies that had no track record in the field. The question was whether
or not people could operate in the type of technological environment
characteristic of new types of processes that were being suggested by
theory. The fear was that the behavioral/cognitive demands required
by the processes would render them infeasible.
These early issues were brought into focus at a meeting held at the
California Institute of Technology in January of 1994. Experimentalists
addressed this issue directly by demonstrating the operation of decen-
tralized electronic auction processes. Computerized auctions have been
operating for years in laboratories, where they have been used in exper-
iments. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated conclusively that
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people are generally capable of dealing with the ``technologically inten-
sive'' processes that are applied in modern electronic and computerized
auctions. They have also demonstrated that the necessary software and
hardware exist in operational form and can be made reliable. Thus,
at the Caltech conference, the operation of new processes, based on
electronic technology, was demonstrated.
In addition, conference presentations were made by the Pacific
Stock Exchange and other parties familiar with the operations of elec-
tronic and computerized market processes. Thus, while the issue of the
tried and true against something new continued to be raised in some
in the debates, experimental data existed that could be used as an an-
swer to those concerned about the issue and, in some respects, clearly
demonstrated that the problem of information and cognitive limitations
of people would not be an insurmountable obstacle to the implementa-
tion of new types of auctions. It also became clear that technology was
not an obstacle. The consensus developed that new rules could be used,
and the discussion moved to consider the forms that they might take.
4.2 Simultaneous Auctions vs. Sequential Japanese
Auctions with a Package Bid
Very early on the discussions became narrowed to two different auction
architectures. These two competing architectures were the focus of
many of the early experiments. The experiments were designed to in-
quire about the properties of simultaneous auctions in comparison with
sequential auctions that are accompanied by bids on predetermined
packages. In the latter architecture, a specific set of items would be
offered for sale, either as a package or individually. Sealed bids would
be tendered for the package. The winning bid for the package would
be announced. After the announcement, the markets for individual
items would be opened and the items would then be individually auc-
tioned. Whether the sale was made by package of items to the winning
sealed bid, or by individual items to the winners of the individual-item
markets, was to be determined by which would generate the most
money. The details of the institutions studied are as follows:
4.2.1 Simultaneous, Continuous, Ascending-Price
Auctions for All Items (With and Without Release-to-
Market Provision). Within this set of rules, each license would
be identified in a separate market. All markets would be open simul-
taneously. Bids could be tendered at any time the bidder desired. An
accepted bid must be higher than the existing bid. All markets would
close at the same time, when no market had received a bid for some
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predetermined period of time. That is, if no bids were tendered in any
market for a set period, then all markets would close simultaneously;
but if a bid occurred in any market, then all markets would remain
open for at least the predetermined period.
The method of ending the auction is very important and figures
heavily in the rules finally adopted by the FCC. The FCC auctions
were not continuous, but instead proceeded in rounds. In a continuous
market, the continuous threat of the end serves to force bidders into
action. If there is no action, then the markets close, and the faster the
bidding, the sooner the auction will be over. The introduction of rounds
gives bidders an incentive to wait. Thus, the FCC adopted activity rules
and rules governing eligibility that are not part of the earliest experi-
ments.
The release-to-market provision (withdrawal) gave bidders an op-
portunity to withdraw from units on which they had the high bid. If
a unit is released to the market by a bidder, then the bid price is dropped
and the bidding can then start from the lower level. The bidder who
withdrew from the item would pay the FCC the difference between
the bidder's bid and the final bid at which the item sold. The idea is
that a bidder who failed to get a package would be able to sell the
partial package already acquired back to the market. Reselling during
the auction, as opposed to after the auction closed, might be advanta-
geous because during the auction the demand might be expected to be
strong due to the assembled buyers at the auction.
4.2.2 Sequential, Continuous Auctions with a Sealed
Bid for Packages of Predesignated Collections of
Items. Under this proposal, the sealed bids would be opened prior
to the opening of the markets in which individual items would be
auctioned. Two different possibilities existed to govern the sequence
chosen for the individual item auctions: (1) Japanese auctions would be
conducted for each item, with items sold in random order; (2) Japanese
auctions would be conducted for each item, with individual items auc-
tioned in the order from highest expected value to the lowest.
Four institutional features need to be emphasized. First, the auc-
tions for individual items are continuous. There are no rounds or stages
in the bidding, so the termination rule is that the auction remains open
until only one person is left. Second, the Japanese auction is an ascend-
ing-price auction that differs from an ordinary one only in the way
that bids are tendered. The price goes up at a pace determined by the
auctioneer. All bidders are considered to be ``in,'' that is, agreeing to
purchase at the stated price, unless the bidder has explicitly chosen to
``drop out.'' A bidder who has ``dropped out'' is no longer an active
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bidder on the item and has no standing to buy it, regardless of the final
price. The price is determined as soon as only one bidder remains ``in.''
That is, the auction stops when the next to the last bidder ``drops out.''
The person valuing the item most gets it at the value of the bidder with
the second-highest bid value.
The third dimension of the rule is the sequence. The items are sold
one at a time in order. In one case, the order is randomly determined. In
another case, the items are sold in the order beginning with the item
with the highest expected value. In the experiment the values of items
are randomly drawn with publicly known distributions conditional on
the item. Thus, the item for which the expected value is the highest is
sold first. In the field there is often common agreement about the items
that are likely to bring the highest prices when offered. That feature of
common agreement is captured by the experimental procedure.
The fourth dimension of the rule is a sealed bid for a package
that is opened before the auction. That is, the results of the sealed-bid
auction are to be made public before bidding on the individual items
begins. The collection that constitutes the package is designated prior to
the auction. If the items, when auctioned individually, do not command
prices that total more than the items would bring if sold at the winning
sealed bid, then they are sold as a package to the bidder tendering the
highest sealed bid. If the items command a sum of prices from the
individual auctions that is greater than the sealed bid, then they are
sold individually.
4.3 Rules and Performance
The overriding question posed for research was related to the efficiency
of the allocations fostered by the auction rules. Closely related ques-
tions concerned the mechanisms through which the rules operated.
What were the sources of any observed inefficiencies? In particular,
could packages be efficiently assembled from independent markets,
or could bidders for independent components compete successfully
against a bid for a package? Who was advantaged or disadvantaged
in different architectures? What was the revenue-generating potential
of the different rules?
Experiments were conducted with seven and with nine items for
auction. Each agent had a private value induced for each of the items
offered for auction. In some cases, agents had a superadditive value
for a collection of all items. Superadditive means that the value of the
collection of all items was greater for the agent than the sum of the
values of the items when considered individually. In other cases, agents
had superadditive values for a specific collection of three of the items.
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The key feature of parametric configurations was whether the
superadditive value for the collection was greater than the sum of the
highest (first) values of the items considered independently, or was
less. If the superadditive value of the collection is greater than the sum
of the first values, then the efficient allocation is that the items should
be sold as a package to the agent with the superadditive value. If the
sum of the first values is greater than the superadditive value, then the
efficient allocation is that items be sold individually. If the auction fails
to deliver the items to the hands of the agents valuing them the most,
then the efficiency of the auction suffers. An auction that operates at
100% efficiency has managed to deliver the items exactly to the agents
who value them the most.
In order to make data comparable across institutional treatments,
the same environmental parameters were conducted in the same se-
quence of periods for the institutions compared. Thus, subjects in differ-
ent institutional treatments were exposed to the same sequence of val-
ues. Of course, the subjects differed across institutional treatments. If
the experiment involved sequential auctions, with items auctioned
from highest (expected) value to lowest value, then the agents were
informed of the probability distribution from which agent's values
were drawn.
Pressures of time and money substantially limited the amounts
of experimental data that could be collected. Had the FCC developed
a research and funding strategy to facilitate a confident and fully scien-
tific approach, the data would be much richer and decisions would
have been made on much more reliable evidence, but that was not the
case. The research environment was much more akin to a management
situation in which judgments were to be made and having some data
is better than having no data. The strategy was to select certain key
aspects of the parameter/theory space and collect such data as one
could. The experiments were chosen to highlight and explore key points
of interaction among competing theories. Exactly how these selections
were made and the nature of the statistical arguments that might be
made involve detail that cannot be reported here. Because of the limita-
tions on data, the key results are labeled as ``observations'' and the
data are ``illustrative,'' as opposed to the frequently used terminology
of ``result'' and ``support.''
In spite of the limitations on the number and variety of data, the
patterns that do exist in the data are unambiguous. The first observation
summarizes the overall pattern by using efficiency comparisons. The
auction system efficiency suffers in the presence of a sealed package
bid and sequential Japanese auction procedures as compared to the
simultaneous auction alternative.
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FIGURE 1. EFFICIENCY BY PERIOD: THE SIMULTANEOUS
PROCESS HAS AN EFFICIENCY EDGE
Observation 1: The overall efficiency of the simultaneous auctions
(with a release provision) is higher in all experiments than the Japanese auc-
tions with a sealed bid.
Data illustration. Figure 1 contains a good example of the data. Com-
pared here are two experiments under the same conditions in each
period, for a sequence of periods. The individual parameters changed
each period, and shown at the bottom of the figure is a notation that
indicates if the efficient allocation has items allocated to different indi-
viduals (I) or has a collection of items sold to one individual (C). Notice
that in twelve out of fifteen periods the efficiency of the simultaneous
auctions is at least as high as the Japanese counterpart, and in seven
periods the efficiency of the sequential auctions is strictly better. In
only three of the fifteen periods is the efficiency of the Japanese auction
higher than that of the simultaneous auction with release.
Figure 1 contains hints for additional observations. Notice that
the instances in which the efficiency of the Japanese auction exceeds
the efficiency of the simultaneous auctions are almost always those in
which the sealed-bid package is supposed to win according to the effi-
cient allocation. This suggests that the sealed-bid option creates an ad-
vantage for the package. The next result makes that property clear.
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Observation 2: The existence of the package bid option creates an ad-
vantage for the agent who wants the collection defined by the package.
Data illustration. Tables I±III contain relevant data. The data are di-
vided into two cases. The first case is one in which the value of the
collection to some single agent is greater than the sum of the highest
agent values of the items considered individually (and thus should be
sold as package to a single agent). The second case is where the maxima
of agent values, when considering the items individually, sum to more
than the value of the collection to any single agent. In this second case,
the items should be sold individually to different agents. Under all
conditions studied, when a package bid exists as part of the rules, the
collection is sold as a package to a single agent when it should be sold
that way, but in about half of the cases in which the items should be
sold individually, they are nevertheless sold to the single individual
who wants the collection as a package. By comparison, under the other
auction rules, in which no package bid is tendered, the collection is
TABLE I.
Seven-Item Experiments with Two Collections of
Three Items with Superadditive Valuesa
Japanese Auction
Simultaneous
Sealed Bid for Auction with
Package, No Sealed Bids, Withdrawal
Random Order Random Order Provision
Value of the Collection was 2 successes/ 2 successes/ 5 successes/
package is successfully 2 periods 2 periods 6 periods
greater than the assembled
sum of the first
values
Collection 2 of 2 assembled 1 of 2 5 of 5 assembled
assembled collections assembled collections
was were profitable collections were profitable
profitable were
profitable
Value of the Collection was 5 successes/ 0 successes/ 0 successes/
package is less successfully 10 periods 10 periods 6 periods
than the sum of assembled
the first values
Collection 5 of 5 assembled
assembled collections
was were profitable
profitable
a (Number of times event occurred)/(number of times event was possible).
Laboratory Experimental Testbeds 617
TABLE II.
Nine-Item Experiments with Superadditive Values
for All Nine Itemsa
Japanese Auction Simultaneous Auction
with Sealed Bid
for Package, No Withdrawal Withdrawal
Random Order Provision Provision
Value of the Collection was 2 successes/ 4 successes/ 3 successes/
package is successfully 3 periods 9 periods 4 periods
greater than the assembled
sum of the first
values
Collection 2 of 2 assembled 2 of 2 assembled 3 of 3 assembled
assembled collections collections collections
was were profitable were profitable were profitable
profitable
Value of the Collection was 5 successes/ 0 successes/ 0 successes/
package is less successfully 15 periods 8 periods 3 periods
than the sum of assembled
the first values
Collection 5 of 5 assembled
assembled collections
was were profitable
profitable
a (Number of times event occurred)/(number of times event was possible).
never sold as a package when it should not be. The relative advantage
of a package bidding process to the agent wanting the package is clear.
M
Comparative experiments between the simultaneous auctions
and sequential Japanese auctions with a package sealed bid yield the
properties summarized by the next two observations.
Observation 3: A bidder wanting the package is advantaged by the
Japanese auction with a sealed bid for a package, as compared to the same
bidder operating under the simultaneous auction rules:
(i) The sealed-bid process always produces an assembled package when one
should be assembled, while the simultaneous auctions sometimes fail to
produce a successfully purchased collection.
(ii) The sealed-bid process frequently produces an assembled package when it
should not produce one, while the simultaneous auction never produces
a package when it should not.
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TABLE III.
Nine-Item Experiments with Superadditive Values
for all Nine Itemsa
Japanese Auction
with Sealed Bid Simultaneous
for package, Auction with
Ordered by Withdrawal
Expected Values Provision
Value of the Collection was 7 successes/ 4 successes/
package is successfully 7 periods 6 periodsb
greater than the assembled
sum of the first
values
Collection 7 of 7 assembled 4 of 4 assembled
assembled collections collections
was were profitable were profitable
profitable
Value of the Collection was 6 successes/ 0 successes/
package is less successfully 9 periods 8 periods
than the sum of assembled
the first values
Collection 6 of 6 assembled
assembled collections
was were profitable
profitable
a (Number of times event occurred)/(number of times event was possible).
b Two never tried to get the collection.
Data illustration. Tables I±III contain relevant data. In Table I the
results of experiments with three item packages are shown. First, con-
sider the sequential Japanese auction with and without a package bid.
When it was possible to submit a bid for a package, the package always
won when it should have won (2 of 2 possibilities) but it also won half
of the time when it should not have won (5 of 10 possibilities). The
package was always profitable. Consider now a comparison with the
simultaneous auction. In the three-item collection experiments, the col-
lection was almost always assembled when it should have been (5 of
6 possibilities) and was never assembled when it should not have been
(0 of 6 possibilities). In Table II, the nine-item collection was success-
fully assembled when it should have been in most of the instances
under both the Japanese auctions and the simultaneous auctions with
the release provision. However, in the cases in which the collection
should not have been assembled, it was nevertheless successfully as-
sembled in one-third of the possibilities (5 of 15 possibilities) under the
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Japanese auction with the sealed bid, but it was never successfully
assembled when it should not have beenÐwhen the auction was oper-
ating under the simultaneous auction rules.
M
Observation 4: The existence of a sealed bid harms the profits on the
items that come late in a sequence of auctions.
Data illustration. Under the sequential auction rules, those that win
the early auctions have an incentive to bid up the prices of the items
that come later in the sequence. These bidders do not want to win the
items, but they do want the prices to be high, so the total of the collec-
tion will be above the sealed bid. For example, in a paired experiment
of identical parameters, the price of the final item auctioned under the
sequential Japanese rules was higher than the same item sold under
the simultaneous auction rules (with no package bid) in eight of fifteen
periods, while the reverse was true in only three of the fifteen periods.
In the remaining four cases, the prices were essentially the same.
M
The next observation is implicit in the discussion of the observa-
tions stated above. It is simply stated without a review of the data.
Observation 5: An order of individual item auctions, from the highest-
to the lowest-valued items, creates an advantage for the sealed bid.
The final observation explores the sources of inefficiency in the
simultaneous auctions that were studied. The data show that the ineffi-
ciencies were not so much from a failed attempt at putting together a
package, as from a failure to make any attempt at all. Inefficiency was
not so much due to the difficulty of coordination, as it was to the per-
ceived risk in the attempt.
Observation 6: Inefficiencies in the simultaneous auctions are due pri-
marily to a failure of the agent with the highest value for the collection to
attempt to buy the collection. The release rule reduces the perceived risk of
attempting to buy the collection and thereby improves efficiency.
Data illustration. Package assembly, under the parameters studied
(a competitive equilibrium exists), is almost always successful when
attempted, and successful packages have always been profitable. In the
three-item cases the collections were purchased in five of the six in-
stances in which it was efficient to do so, and in the nine-item case it
occurred in three of the four times. The most dramatic departure from
success was in the seven-item experiments, in which only four attempts
were made in seven instances. The power of the release provision is
shown by the nine-item experiments in which no release provision
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existed. Without the release provision, in only four of the nine instances
in which the collection should have been sold to a single individual
did the individual attempt the purchase, and then only two of these
attempts were profitable.
M
The exact behavior of the auctions can be sensitive to very subtle
details of how the auction process operates. For example, as is noted
in Observations 4 and 5, there is a tendency to drive up the prices of
competitors, especially when it may help increase the sum of individual
values of a package to exceed the sealed bid on the package. This strat-
egy is risky in that a bidder may end up a winner of unwanted items.
In the Japanese auctions, bidders seem to become emboldened when
they have information about the number of other bidders that are ``in.''
A bidder seeing several other bidders ``in'' is willing to stay in ``a little
longer''Ðcontributing to a type of bubble that drives the price up fur-
ther than it would have been if information about the number of other
bidders had not been present.1 Even if the information is not officially
available as part of the organized auction, the procedures may be such
that it can be inferred. For example, if all bidders are in the same room,
and if exit from the auction is accompanied by a click of a key, or a
blink of a screen, or any number of other subtle sources of information,
such bubbles might exist even when efforts are made to prevent them.
The discovery of such phenomena underscores the need to study the
operational details of auctions.
Summarizing all observations leads to the following conjecture
about the implication of the rules when implemented in environments
such as those in the experiments:
1. The simultaneous auctions with release are more efficient than are
the Japanese auctions with a sealed bid for the package.
2. The existence of the sealed bid for a package creates an advantage
for the agent wanting the collection, and it creates a disadvantage
for those wanting items late in the auction sequence (perhaps the
smallest agents).
3. Inefficiencies in the simultaneous auctions are primarily due to the
fact that agents who would have a collection in the efficient alloca-
1. There seems to be no theoretical foundation for this phenomenon, since expecta-
tions of the actions of others could cause the same behavior. Nevertheless, in experiments
with the information removed such bubbles were less pronounced if they existed at all.
Of course, the numbers of experiments are very small here, so the data can be relied on
little more than developing an intuition about what a more complete study would show.
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tion never attempt to assemble the package because of risk aversion.
When such agents do attempt to get the collection, they can succeed.
4.4 Lurking Problems and Alternative Rules
Soon after the Caltech conference, the FCC began to focus on simultane-
ous auctions with withdrawal provisions as the appropriate set of rules.
As the rules began to take form throughout the rulemaking process,
the research began to focus on related issues. A primary concern of
researchers, but not necessarily the FCC, was the sensitivity of the be-
havioral characteristics of the auction process to the environment in
which it might be operating. While much information had been pro-
duced about the general properties of the simultaneous ascending-price
auction with a release provision in comparison with other rules involv-
ing sequences of auctions, questions remained about how this set of
rules might perform in special environments that might reasonably be
expected to be present in the circumstances in which the FCC auction
would be operating. How were the rules going to perform under the
economic environmental circumstances that were thought to exist? Do
potential problems exist (in light of nonconvexities, superadditive val-
ues, and uncertain common values)? If problems exist, are they generic
in the sense that they would almost certainly be encountered, and does
the interdependence that they foster promote other types of behavior,
such as collusion?
It is well known that nonconvexities and superadditive (comple-
mentary) values can destroy the existence of the equilibrium in the
competitive model and can also cause instabilities. However, very little
is known about what might happen in actual markets with these prop-
erties, and during the early stages of rulemaking, nothing was known
about the behavior of the particular rules ultimately adopted by the
FCC. Figure 2 can be used to demonstrate the nature of some of the
lurking problems in a very simple example, which can be applied to
both the competitive model and the FCC auction rules.
Suppose the world consisted of four agents with strong comple-
mentary tastes for only two units. The essence of complementarity is
that values of sets of items are greater than the sum of the items when
considered independently. In this case, pairs of licenses have strong
complementarities. The complementarity can be seen by the fact that
the value of an item depends on whether it is the only item held or is
held in the presence of another item. One could say that a special syn-
ergy exists for two units, but agents place zero marginal value on the
third unit. In the figure the marginal values of each of the four agents
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FIGURE 2. SUPERADDITIVE VALUES: COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM DOES NOT EXIST
are displayed in the order of the average value of two units, starting
with the agent with the highest average value, agent A, and continuing
to the agent with the lowest average value, agent D. Only five units
are offered for sale.
The example and the similar examples that follow, can be used
to make two points: (1) the auction can lead to losses by participants;
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(2) there may be instabilities or ``cycles'' that delay termination or even
prevent the auction from stopping.
In order to develop an intuition about how such phenomena
might occur, notice first that no competitive equilibrium exists. There
is no price that equates supply with demand. At any price below the
average value for agent C (the marginal buyer), demand exceeds sup-
ply, and at any price at or above the average value for C, supply exceeds
demand. The fact that licenses are lumpy creates a nonconvexity in the
environment that destroys the existence of that type of equilibrium.
Now, notice that the complementarities create an instability at the
margin that has a marginal propensity to push prices up. This property
can lead to a loss. Suppose agent C acquires one unit in a simultaneous
ascending-bid auction; then, if the agent follows a local, marginal ad-
justment, (s)he is willing to bid prices up to the marginal value of the
second unit. Since all units are identical, there must only be one price
in the market, and at the price of the second unit for agent C, all agents,
including C, lose money. The price is above the average value of all
agents. Thus, as one can see, in this environment these rules have a
potential, theoretically, for leading bidders into circumstances in which
they can suffer a loss even though all ``local'' decisions are profit-im-
proving to the deciding agent.
If the rules contain a release clause, then theory gives no guide
to how the process might stop. If prices ascend to above the average
value of any of the agents, then (s)he may want to release the unit to
the market and take a certain loss, rather than test the competition into
larger regions of loss. When the price is sufficiently low, it could attract
a new buyer (such as D) and start the spiral upward again. Thus, from
a naive, theoretical point of view, the auction could experience a series
of withdrawals over long periods of time and never attain a natural
closing within an acceptable time frame. Prices would just cycle.
Experiments demonstrated that the theoretical possibility of
losses is also a real possibility. Figure 3 contains the data from an experi-
ment with parameters of the form discussed above. The rules were
very similar to those ultimately used by the FCC, except that the auc-
tions were continuous as opposed to involving rounds, and there were
no activity rules because of the nature of the stopping rule. A separate
market was open for each item, and all markets were simultaneously
open. The rule for each market was an ascending-price auction in which
any bidder could submit a bid on any item at any time as long as the
bid was greater than the previous bid. All markets closed simultane-
ously when no market showed activity (bids) for some fixed amount
of time (e.g., a minute). This stopping rule seemed to eliminate the
need for activity rules. Individuals could withdraw or release an item
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FIGURE 3.
to the market. When a withdrawal occurred, the price was reduced to
zero and all bidding started over. If the final price was below the bid
that had been made by the withdrawing bidder, the bidder paid the
difference.
In Figure 3 the horizontal lines represent some of the important
parameters of the experiment. The top horizontal line is the counterpart
of the marginal value of the second unit for agent C. If the price is bid
to the level of the top horizontal line, then losses will certainly occur.
The two middle lines are the counterparts of the average value for C
and D, respectively. The data represent the bids on all items and the
time of submission, measured as the number of seconds that elapsed
from the opening of the auction. As can be seen, the time series of bids
begins low and continues along what appears to be an exponential
path, with some interesting waves, until the auction ends. As is readily
observable, the prices of items tend to equate and finally settle near
the average value of the marginal agent. Of course, since the marginal
agent had a unit at this price, (s)he lost money.
Experiments also demonstrated that the theoretical possibility of
cycles is also real. Figure 4 contains data from two additional experi-
ments. Again, the data follow a roughly exponential path toward the
average value of the marginal agent. Again, jumps or waves are present.
However, in panel A of Figure 4 an item is released. According to the
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FIGURE 4. WITHDRAWALS
rules of this auction, any released item begins at a price of zero, so a
sequence of bids that bring the price of the released items up to the
levels of the others is observed. Since the new price of the item is above
the average value of the marginal person, the new holder lost money.
Panel B shows that releases can occur more than once during an auction.
As can be seen in that experiment, the item was released two times,
leading to a cycle of length three.
The existence of strong complementarities creates a special kind
of competition that does not facilitate efficiency. Complex synergies
foster complex fitting problems from which substantial gains are possi-
ble. This process of coordination that is necessary for fitting might be
accompanied by other activities considered undesirable. If a competitor
detects that a rival or two have managed to coordinate their actions so
they fit, the firm can damage them both by getting into the bidding
action. This is a type of destructive competition in which one agent can
make it difficult for a competitor to obtain a package, even when the
package represents an efficient allocation. An agent might try to dam-
age others that (s)he views as competitors by driving up the prices, or
by acquiring key elements of a package that is of special value to a
competitor or to the fit of a group of competitors. Evidence of the ability
and the willingness of agents to engage in bidding activities intended
626 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
only to influence the allocations of other agents was contained in Result
4. Further evidence was exhibited in by the willingness of competitors
to drive up the price to rivals in the Japanese auction. No systematic
evidence exists on the nature of this type of competition. Indeed, we
do not understand the role it might play in the allocation process. But,
what we do have suggests that it cannot be simply dismissed as implau-
sible.
If selective competition is thought to be a problem, one response
might be to shield the identities of the agents. Firms would then be
unable to collude and would be unable to identify particular rivals that
they would be willing to damage. However, such a response has its
difficulties. If a firm is attempting to put together some sort of package,
then other firms might be advised to explore packages that fit. Success-
ful fitting would be difficult to achieve by simple random bidding: it
requires an understanding of the firm's intentions. Indeed, it might
be important to call attention to a coordination problem or to force
coordination concessions by tendering bids that could be interpreted
as destructive. However, to understand the other firm's strategy, it is
necessary to be able to identify that firm through bids. Multiple identifi-
cation numbers have been suggested in this context. A firm could use
some identification numbers to signal intentions where needed and
other identification numbers to hide. These complex strategic possibili-
ties have not been explored. We only know that the potential exists
and that there might be institutional ``fixes.''
The final environmental problem stems from the fact that the PCS
licenses are thought to have a common but uncertain value. It has been
well established experimentally that in such environments a winner's
curse phenomenon can exist [for a review of the literature, see Kagel
and Roth (1995)]. Each bidder has private information about the com-
mon value. If this information is distributed with the true value as a
mean, then the highest privately estimated value is greater than the
true value. If propensity to bid is positively related to privately esti-
mated value, then the high bidder will be the agent whose private value
is the highest above the true value. Unless this property of auctions is
recognized, the agent will bid more for the item than its value and as
a result suffer a loss from the auction. How this might work out when
there is a sequence of bids and complementarities is simply unknown.
No experiments have been conducted that provide an assessment of
what the dimensions of the problem might be.
In summary, the FCC auction is exploring domains of economic
environments about which very little is known: nonconvexities, com-
plementarities, and asymmetric information. The rules of the auction
were designed specifically to cope with parts of these environmental
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conditions. The simultaneous nature of the auctions and the with-
drawal feature were specifically implemented to facilitate efficient allo-
cations in the presence of such features. Nevertheless, problems are
lurking. It is easy to find parameter values at which agents suffer losses,
the system cycles, and the results are not even close to 100% efficient.
Does withdrawal help in the very difficult cases, or does it simply lure
people into traps in which they can lose money?
Modifications of the simultaneous auctions are still a subject of
research. One issue is whether or not the process should be continuous,
as opposed to the stages that are now used. Continuous auctions have
many advantages. In particular, with continuous auctions there is no
obvious need for activity rules and the related complex stopping rules.
The stages seem be a response to businesses expressing a need to have
time to make decisions, garner the capital for big purchases, and assem-
ble the information needed for bidding. The stages also seem to reflect
some doubt about the ability of technology to facilitate a continuous
auction.
A lack of confidence in technology, as well as a lack of theory,
seemed to dampen enthusiasm for the implementation of a ``smart
market'' that would be capable of dealing with complex bids for pack-
ages of licenses. Many experiments have explored the use of package
bidding in the context of electronic markets.2 Such markets have dem-
onstrated a capability of solving very hard coordination problems. How
they might be made to manage common-value problems or destructive
competition remains to be determined.
5. The Development and Implementation of
Auction Technology: The Second Stage
The second stage of applications involved testing the implementation
of the specific rules selected to govern the auction. The problems that
were addressed stemmed from three sources.
First, the language of lawyers and those writing policy is not pre-
cise from the point of view of game theorists, who attempt to model
the behavior of the system. Terms that make sense from the point of
view of the law can be very imprecise and, depending upon interpreta-
tion, could have dramatic effects on the structure of the auction and
consequent behavior.
Second, complex systems of rules involve subtle interactions and
2. There are different styles of such markets. For examples see Banks et al. (1989),
Brewer and Plott (1996), Plott and Porter (1997), Rassenti et al. (1994), and Rassenti et
al. (1982).
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ambiguities. Rules must be internally consistent, and they must be com-
plete in the sense that an outcome is produced by the process under
all circumstances. The complex ways in which the rules interact, and
the presence of ambiguities, do not become evident until one tries to
actually implement the rules in an operational environment. Thus, as
part of the research it was necessary to evaluate the consistency and
completeness of the rules themselves, as opposed to any assessment
of behavior within the context of the rules. A laboratory experiment
requires the translation of policy concepts to operational concepts, so
the process of experimentation actually produces a working auction
prototype.
The third source of problems stemmed from the software and
hardware. It was necessary to determine if the software and procedures
of the auction successfully implemented the rules, as stated in policy.
Even if the rules were complete and consistent in one implementation,
they might not be in another. Software implementation and auction
procedures must be explored from the point of view of game theory
and the strategic opportunities that a real environment fosters.
A group of economists from Caltech3 was contracted to test the
software and advise on rules and their implementation. Cantor-Fitzger-
ald was contracted to develop the software for the first narrowband
auction in July, 1994. After the July auction, another contractor was
selected to develop software for subsequent auctions. Evidently, the
FCC wanted to own the software and this was not consistent with the
interests of Cantor-Fitzgerald, which used modifications of software
that the company uses for market making in the bond industry. The
Caltech team was associated with the development and implementa-
tion of both technologies.
There are several problems that exist in the many steps between
policy conception and operational implementation in the field. First,
the exact ``rules'' were always in a state of evolution. There is a learning
that takes place as the rules are implemented. The interactions among
rules are subtle. A conflict exists between fairness and proper price
discovery, and as this conflict is discovered, there is a tendency for the
latter to give way to the former under the pressure of politics. For
example, if the auction is taking too long and must be stopped, how
should that be accomplished? Many reasonable answers to such ques-
tions advanced, such as a single best and final offer, closing specific
markets in which no new bids have been tendered, requiring bidders
to bid only on items on which they previously bid, etc.
3. They were John Ledyard, Charles Plott, and Dave Porter.
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It was perceived that a person might have special reasons not to
want to bid, so waivers were invented, and then automatic waivers
were required of the software. The concepts of withdrawals, eligibility,
increments, and announcement of stage changes all involve reasonable-
sounding concepts when considered alone, but there remain questions
about how they might interact with each other, with other policies, and
with the realities of software performance. Can one waive and bid at
the same time? What happens if you withdraw at the end of the auction:
should the auction remain open so the withdrawal can be cleared? How
shall a withdrawal be priced? How is eligibility of everyone influenced
by withdrawals? Should it go up so anyone can buy the item released
to the market? How is eligibility influenced by increments: should eligi-
bility be lost if increments are reduced because of lack of bids? As
these interactions become discovered, there is a tendency to change the
policy.
In the first FCC auctions there was a tendency for policy changes
to take place without a full recognition of what they might mean for
software development and the time needed for that development and
testing, as well as the likelihood that small changes in policy would
create a need for further changes that would be discovered only as the
implementation advanced. More importantly, the technical complexity
and subtleties of game implementation were not fully recognized and
reflected in the procedures for communicating with software devel-
opers. Moreover, the importance and the technical complexity of the
link between policy and rigorous institutional design was not fully
appreciated, and that led to problems that were potentially very severe.
When the Caltech team first tested the Cantor-Fitzgerald software,
they discovered that Cantor had not been properly informed about the
time line within an auction. The contractor was unaware of the exis-
tence of rounds. It was also unaware of the time line within a round
(that there was a bidding period followed by a computation period
that was followed by a withdrawal period, etc., within each round).
The policy language was not sufficiently precise to identify exact ac-
tions with time. For example, Cantor had been led to believe that phase
3 was a ``stay in your own lane'' policy in the sense that bidders could
only bid on the exact item on which they had been bidding previously.
In fact phase 3 required that the number/size of licenses could not be
expanded, except possibly by very little. A week before the first auction,
the Cantor programming team met with the Caltech team and the FCC.
From that meeting a complete reprogramming of the auction software
was undertaken according to an architecture that previously had not
been communicated to Cantor.
Time pressure before the first auction gave very little opportunity
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to test the Cantor software before the July auction took place. Because
of these difficulties, the FCC felt the need to provide a nonelectronic
backup system for the July auction. It hired the Caltech team to develop
one. This backup was made possible by the fact that all bidders were
at the same location, a hotel meeting room. The Caltech experimental-
ists had practice and experience in implementing such auctions in labo-
ratory environments. To the Caltech group it was simply a bigger ex-
periment than the ones that they had been conducting all along. When
implemented during the July auction, the backup system ran in parallel
with the Cantor electronic system, which operated successfully. The
backup system was just about as fast as the Cantor system, and also
operated without flaw.
After the July auction, the FCC contracted with new software
developers. The Caltech group agreed to test the new software to make
sure the rules were appropriately implemented. However, testing was
made very difficult by FCC policies. The FCC adopted a policy of not
letting the Caltech team have access to the final software, study (or see)
the code, or even talk directly to a software developer. Thus, the auction
process was a ``black box'' from the point of view of the Caltech testers.
The strategy for dealing with the problem of testing was to imple-
ment a three-part system. First, the overall strategy adopted by the
experimentalists was to use the software as it would be used in an
experiment. Preferences were induced by application of standard ex-
perimental economics techniques. Subjects then used the software in a
series of actual experimental auctions that lasted several days. During
these experiments the subjects were at Caltech, but the computers and
the FCC auctioneers were in Washington, DC. This methodology facili-
tated learning derived from user experiences who were engaging the
equipment as it would be engaged in practice.
The second part of the strategy was to get problems identified
and documented as they were revealed. The heart of the second part
of the strategy involved payments (sizable bounties of one hundred
dollars or more) to subjects able to find errors in any facet of the auction
system. Student subjects from Caltech were trained at the beginning
of the summer. They completely understood the details of rules and
subtle variations of the rules. The same subjects were used over and
over for anything that dealt with software tests. The subjects were paid
for keeping notebooks and diaries, so a clear record was maintained
about the time and the state of the system when errors were (asserted
to be) found. This second procedure allowed us to utilize the special
knowledge and skills of this trained subject pool. The subjects explored
the rules, the auction setup procedures, and even the user-friendliness
of the software. These user bounty procedures are commonly used by
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experimentalists when developing software for laboratory use. From
the point of view of the users, the experiments revealed many practical
software problems that could have caused serious difficulties if discov-
ered in the field during the FCC auctions.4
A third system of checks was a system of ``parallel checking.'' Since
the FCC auction software and procedures were used to conduct experi-
ments, the data from the experimental auction were available. These
data were fed into a parallel auction software system for computation
and comparisons. The parallel system took the raw bid data and from
them recomputed all numbers computed by the FCC auction com-
puters. These computations were made during the experiment and af-
terwards. The parallel system operated from a program that we devel-
oped ourselves and for which we were virtually certain that the proper
rules and computations had been implemented. All computations
made by the FCC programs were rechecked. This method of checking
proved valuable in several instances when we were able to reverse-
engineer the FCC system to identify the source of programming errors.5
6. The Auctions and a Retrospective on
Performance: The Third Stage
The final stage of the research was to provide advice during the opera-
tion of the actual FCC auction. Regardless of the amount of preparation
and testing, things happen. Behavior might not be as anticipated due
to environmental surprises. In spite of testing, rules can be incomplete
and policy must sometimes be made on the spot. Decisions must be
made on the spot from experience and judgment. During the first auc-
4. Some examples of the types of tests are: What happens if you stay logged on after
the initial withdrawal; what happens if you log in from multiple locations at the same
time; what happens if you enter 0000 rather than 0; what happens if you are theoretically
inactive but nevertheless log on after various events; what happens if you log in at the
last second of a session or have a power failure; what happens if you follow local software
installation exactly to the letter of the instructions? The complaints about friendliness
were enough to create enemies: my screen scrolls too fast, too much, too slow; response
is too fast, too slow; etc. The test experiments put substantial pressure on the whole FCC
auction organization to do rounds quickly, which was important, since the speed of the
rounds is a variable that might be used to speed the termination of the overall auction.
5. Important rounding errors were discovered. A miscomputation of eligibility, a
type of double counting after a withdrawal, was discovered. Difficulties with eligibility
computations after waivers and between phases were checked with this method. The
subjects were attempting many unexpected combinations of actions in their attempt to
find errors themselves, and this variability in behavior provided an excellent opportunity
to check the internal operations of the ``black box'' that we were given to reverse-engineer.
Many bugs were found and corrected, but one can never be positive about software
reliability.
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tions, the experimentalists were the only ones that had studied the
actual operations of auctions like the one implemented by the FCC.
The hope was that the insights that resulted from observing laboratory
experiments would be helpful in the field application.
The active participation of the experimentalists during an auction
occurred only in the first auction in July 1994. It was here that the
procedures for interacting with the bidders and the rules for the real-
time operation of the auctions began to take form. An increment com-
mittee was formed by the FCC. The job of this committee was to provide
policy advice about the minimum allowable bids, the speed of rounds,
announcements, the implementation of stages, etc. Plott was a member
of the committee, in addition to participating in the backup process.
The experiences gained from laboratory experiments informed
the management of the first auction in two ways. Firstly, the experi-
ments had produced many examples of the interaction of procedures,
rules, and events that could cause problems in the auction itself, or
invite litigation afterwards. Secondly, the patterns of activity in the
FCC could be interpreted in the light of the behavior of experiments
to gain insights about what was taking place and what might be ex-
pected in future rounds.
Laboratory experiments had demonstrated a propensity for
agents to misunderstand subtle aspects of the rules. If this happened
in the FCC auction, it might be the foundation for a court case. It order
to prevent this possibility, during each round the auctioneer made an-
nouncements to bidders about critical aspects of the rules, especially
those regarding withdrawal and the role of eligibility. Near the end of
the auction these general announcements were clearly unnecessary, but
those in charge of the auction kept a close eye on agents who might
be exhibiting confusion. Help was made available for clarifications of
the rules.
The speed of the auction was a general concern. The increment
committee was formed to force bids upward and thus speed the process
to termination by determining for each license the minimum acceptable
bid increment. Very early on, the committee chose to demonstrate a
willingness to use no fixed rule. This established the right of the com-
mittee to make such judgments, creating some uncertainty on the part
of bidders that might be useful for managing the auction, and it pro-
vided some flexibility in controls. Some in the FCC thought that a com-
bination of increment rules and stages was sufficient control to speed
up the auction and bring it to an efficient termination. A tension existed
between the idea that more time to make considered bids, coupled with
higher increments on acceptable bids, would speed the auction, and
on the other hand, the idea that the termination of the auction should
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be governed primarily by the number of rounds. Thus, one theory
would have the auction take more time between rounds, and the other
theory would suggest that the rounds be more frequent. Experimental
evidence suggested that frequent rounds could be relied upon to gener-
ate an efficient and rapid termination. Many of the early experiments
that were allowed to terminate naturally involved continuous-time pro-
cesses without stages. Examination of these data suggested that the
FCC auction could go through as many as a hundred rounds. The more
rapid the rounds, the sooner would be the termination. Experiments
had also produced evidence of the capacity of large increments to be
demand-killing: A bidder failing to bid because of a large increment
could lose eligibility. If the increment was subsequently reduced, the
bidder might not have the eligibility to allow the purchase that (s)he
would have otherwise made at the lower price.
Fear of such an event placed the experimentalists in the camp of
those against the use of large increment requirements on bids. The
possibility of demand-killing policies was very slight as long as the
process operated in stage 1 or 2. However, if stage 3 were implemented,
demand killing would be a real possibility. A disagreement existed
between those who felt that stage 3 would operate like ``brakes'' and
speed the process to termination, and those who felt that more frequent
rounds were a safer way to bring the process to termination.
The first auction was held in a Washington, DC, hotel that the
FCC had rented for only a limited amount of time. If the auction failed
to terminate within the time frame of the rental, then the whole auction
would need to be moved to another location. Because such a move
would involve the transfer of equipment and electronic configurations,
it involved risks to the smooth functioning of the auction. As the final
date approached, support grew for taking the first auction from stage
2 to stage 3 in an attempt to bring it to a close. Plott argued against
this change: (1) in stage 3 the possibility of demand-killing increments
was the greatest; (2) a possibility of withdrawal existed (recall Fig. 4,
panels A and B, above) and if it occurred, demand killing might result;
(3) the software for stage 3 had not been tested (in retrospect there was
a bug); (4) the time path of the bids suggested that the process was
converging to an orderly termination and that there was only a need
to speed the rounds. After consultation with the bidders, the rounds
were speeded and stage 3 was never implemented.
As the auction proceeded, there were continued attempts to make
judgments about the state of the system and where it might go. What
were the patterns that were reminiscent of laboratory auctions? Was
there evidence of scalebacks by bidders because of budgets, and were
marginal buyers evident? Are there similarities between the laboratory
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market and the FCC auction? If there are similarities, what can we
conclude about the FCC auction? The FCC auctions certainly produced
a lot of money, but how would one know if they worked to allocate
the licenses efficiently? What would the experiments tell us to look
for, and under what circumstances should we look? Unfortunately,
research has not yet produced good answers. Here we only examine
one of the major features of the data.
Experiments exhibit equilibration to predictable magnitudes. Fig-
ure 5 reports data from an experiment that was used to test the FCC
software prior to the October auction. The parameters chosen for the
experiment were similar to those that might exist in the auction, and
the general conditions of the experiment were among those that were
thought to possibly exist for the actual auction. Thirty licenses were
offered in the experiment, exactly as in the October auction.
The demands and supplies are shown in Figure 6. The demand
curve for any particular license was derived from the assumption that
all other markets were at the competitive equilibrium price and that
the agents allocated a fixed budget among licenses to maximize the
induced preference. The values of the demand prices are shown above
the curve. The units are on the horizontal axis, and the vertical lines
are the supplies. A different market demand is shown for each of ten
types of licenses. Within a license type the licenses are homogeneous.
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FIGURE 6.
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FIGURE 7.
The competitive equilibrium prices are shown as the prices that are at
the intersection of the market demand and supply.
The revenues from the experiment are shown in Figure 5. The
revenue predicted by the competitive equilibrium model is the horizon-
tal line. As can be seen, the revenue moves upward in a somewhat
wavy fashion along what appears to be an exponential path with a
jump at the end that is probably caused by an FCC intervention in the
experiment.6 This experiment, like many others, converges to near the
competitive equilibrium.
Figure 7 shows the time path of the revenues generated by the
October FCC auction for 30 licenses. As can be seen, there the path has
the same qualities of an exponential path and converges. It also has
the bumps and waves along the path that are evident in the experimen-
tal data. The bottom curve of Figure 7 helps us see the underlying
nature of the revenue-generating process. It is a plot of the value of
excess bids and shows the adjustments in bidding as relative prices
increase. The structure of these changes suggests that the agents oper-
ated with budgets, and when prices got so high that the budget would
have been exceeded, they scaled back to cheaper items. The FCC auc-
tions seem to have a property of equilibration, and if the principles
6. The FCC phoned during the test experiment and informed us that the test must
stop because they needed to move the equipment for a demonstration. The experiment
was terminated shortly after that. A second test conducted in October suffered the same
fate when the FCC called and informed us that ``the next round would be the last.'' The
person in charge had evidently concluded (incorrectly) that the FCC software was work-
ing properly. The parallel computation procedure found an error in the FCC software
later.
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of their operation are the same as those in the experiments, then the
convergence will be near the competitive equilibriumÐshould it exist.
In Figure 6 the allocations in the experiment are shown as the
black squares under the demand curves. The demand curve above the
square is the marginal value of the unit to the buyer, and the number
next to the square is the price paid for the unit. As can be seen, the
prices in the experiment for equivalent items are similar. That is also
a property of the FCC auction data. From the experimental allocations,
we can also determine that the experimental auctions were relatively
efficient. Notice that the units under the demand curve tend to be the
ones acquired, and when the units are the external margins and beyond,
the ones that they replace are simply the units on the internal margin,
so the efficiency loss is not very large. Thus, if the FCC auctions are
operating by the same principles, we can conclude that they are fairly
efficient.
Thus, the FCC auctions and the laboratory experimental auctions
have several qualitative features in common. If indeed the same princi-
ples were operating in the FCC environment, then the FCC auction
converged to near the competitive equilibrium and exhibited high effi-
ciency.
7. Concluding Remarks
While the use of laboratory experimental methodology is still in its
infancy, it seems clear that the value of the techniques was decisively
demonstrated in the development of the FCC auctions. The overall
success of the auctions must be attributed to othersÐeconomic theo-
rists, applied economists, FCC lawyers, and the FCC staff. However,
at certain critical junctures, experimental methods supplied data and
insights that helped identify and solve problems that could have caused
serious damage to the overall auction effort if they had gone unde-
tected. The laboratory methods provided an inexpensive and timely
source of data and experience that supplemented the major efforts in
the policymaking process. The laboratory methods uncovered prob-
lems of a type that could not have been discovered by any other
method, except (possibly very expensive) field testing.
It is interesting to compare the FCC auctions with large-scale engi-
neering projects. The rulemaking procedures that the FCC inherits by
virtue of being a governmental agency would never be used for engi-
neering decisions. Imagine building a spacecraft with detailed engi-
neering decisions made through the processes dictated by administra-
tive procedures. Yet, in many respects, decisions regarding the detail
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of rules for complex auctions are like engineering decisions. The prob-
lems are certainly as complex as those found in engineering projects,
and there exist solid theoretical and experimental foundations for mak-
ing decisions about auction design. The astounding progress that has
taken place in basic scientific research in economics has made this appli-
cation possible. It would seem as though some alternative process
should be created for institutional design problems that permit designs
to reflect scientific considerations as opposed to political considera-
tions. Nevertheless, in spite of what would seem to be the cumbersome
and antiquated procedures dictated by administrative processes, the
FCC produced a system that has so far operated effectively. Hopefully,
the problems that are known to be lurking and are known to be impor-
tant within the types of rules the FCC has adopted will not arise in
future applications. Objective analysis can be applied, and laboratory
testing can be used. Possibly, in the future, the policymaking process
can systematically incorporate these scientific advances into decisions.
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